Double-interval societies

  title={Double-interval societies},
  author={Maria M. Klawe and Kathryn L. Nyman and Jacob N. Scott and Francis Edward Su},
  journal={arXiv: Combinatorics},
Consider a society of voters, each of whom specify an approval set over a linear political spectrum. We examine double-interval societies, in which each person's approval set is represented by two disjoint closed intervals, and study this situation where the approval sets are pairwise-intersecting: every pair of voters has a point in the intersection of their approval sets. The approval ratio for a society is, loosely speaking, the popularity of the most popular position on the spectrum. We… 

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