Double Auctions in Markets for Multiple Kinds of Goods

@inproceedings{SegalHalevi2018DoubleAI,
  title={Double Auctions in Markets for Multiple Kinds of Goods},
  author={Erel Segal-Halevi and Avinatan Hassidim and Yonatan Aumann},
  booktitle={IJCAI},
  year={2018}
}
Motivated by applications such as stock exchanges and spectrum auctions, there is a growing interest in mechanisms for arranging trade in two-sided markets. However, existing mechanisms are either not truthful, do not guarantee an asymptotically-optimal gain-from-trade, rely on a prior on the traders' valuations, or operate in limited settings such as a single type of good. We extend the random-sampling technique used in earlier works to multi-good markets where traders have gross-substitute… 

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