• DOI:10.1177/0265691417711663at
• Corpus ID: 151049961

Donald Weinstein, Savonarola: The Rise and Fall of a Renaissance Prophet

@article{Logan2017DonaldWS,
  title={Donald Weinstein, Savonarola: The Rise and Fall of a Renaissance Prophet},
  author={Oliver Logan},
  journal={European History Quarterly},
  year={2017},
  volume={47},
  pages={600 - 602}
}

• O. Logan
• Published 1 July 2017
• History
• European History Quarterly

doubt whether the ‘moderate’ versions of the myth that the editors refer to existed in practice. Even the supposedly more ‘nuanced’ retired general Hermann von Kuhl refused to admit the possibility of any commonalities between his findings and those of Hans Delbrück, and insisted on defending Ludendorff come what may. In their introduction, the editors miss an important opportunity to evaluate the rich post-1945 historiography on the stab-in-the-back legend. Admittedly, we do get a brief outline of previous works, but this comes without any sustained analysis of the rival interpretations. Furthermore, although some wider contextual issues are explored in depth – the food crisis on the home front and the effects of the Allied economic blockade – others are mentioned only in passing, such as the Reichstag Peace Resolution of 1917, the idea of a ‘council-based government’ or the politically-motivated murders of Hugo Haase, Matthias Erzberger, Walther Rathenau and other democratic politicians in 1919–1922. The body founded in May 1916 to centralize the distribution of food is referred to variously in the text as the War Food Office, the War Food Ministry and the War Food Department. The names of some historians and historical figures are incorrectly or inconsistently spelled. Finally, the ending also jars. While I agree with the editors’ assertion that ‘[t]he truth’ about the causes of Germany’s defeat in 1918 ‘was a complicated matter with multiple moving parts’, I cannot endorse the notion that it was the gullible, sleepy deutsche Michel who was at fault for failing to develop a more questioning attitude towards what really happened in the years 1914–20 (207). Rather blame should be apportioned to the right-wing politicians, judges, newspaper editors and ex-military men who allowed debates about the war and the November 1918 revolution to be framed by the repetition of deliberate lies and falsehoods while dismissing factbased criticism on the grounds that this could only have come from ‘traitors’ and ‘enemies of the people’. Moderate conservative and centrist views were in a distinct minority, and with the left deeply split, the path lay open for the domination of a myth whose proponents claimed to speak for the people even though their real intention was to deny ordinary citizens a democratic voice and destroy the political and social freedoms that the new republic offered.