• Corpus ID: 119087956

Don't choose theories: Normative inductive reasoning and the status of physical theories

  title={Don't choose theories: Normative inductive reasoning and the status of physical theories},
  author={Andr{\'e} C. R. Martins},
  journal={arXiv: History and Philosophy of Physics},
Evaluating theories in physics used to be easy. Our theories provided very distinct predictions. Experimental accuracy was so small that worrying about epistemological problems was not necessary. That is no longer the case. The underdeterminacy problem between string theory and the standard model for current possible experimental energies is one example. We need modern inductive methods for this problem, Bayesian methods or the equivalent Solomonoff induction. To illustrate the proper way to… 
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