Domestic Institutional Constraints, Veto Players, and Sanction Effectiveness

  title={Domestic Institutional Constraints, Veto Players, and Sanction Effectiveness},
  author={Jin Mun Jeong and Dursun Peksen},
  journal={Journal of Conflict Resolution},
  pages={194 - 217}
What effect do the domestic institutional constraints in target states have on sanction outcomes? Other than the narrow focus on political regime type, little is known about how the institutional makeup of target states might affect leaders’ ability to adjust their policies to defy sanctions. We assert that the size of veto players in targets is a crucial yet overlooked institutional factor in explaining sanction effectiveness. We contend that political leaders subject to the approval of… 
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