Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach

  title={Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach},
  author={Michael Tomz},
  journal={International Organization},
  pages={821 - 840}
  • Michael Tomz
  • Published 1 October 2007
  • Political Science
  • International Organization
What makes international threats credible? Recent theories point to domestic audience costs—the domestic price a leader would pay for making foreign threats and then backing down. This article provides the first direct evidence of audience costs. The analysis, based on experiments embedded in public opinion surveys, shows that audience costs exist across a wide range of conditions and increase with the level of escalation. The costs are evident throughout the population, and especially among… 
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