Does external medical review reduce disability insurance inflow?

  title={Does external medical review reduce disability insurance inflow?},
  author={Helge Liebert},
  journal={Journal of health economics},
  • H. Liebert
  • Published 14 January 2019
  • Medicine
  • Journal of health economics

Figures and Tables from this paper

Application and Award Responses to Stricter Screening in Disability Insurance
There are no additional targeting gains at the point of the award decision, implying that changes in average health conditions of awardees were fully driven by self-screening and work resumption in the DI waiting period.
Targeting Disability Insurance Applications with Screening
It is concluded that changes in the health condition of the pool of awarded applicants are fully driven by self-screening of (potential) applicants.
Decomposing Employment Trends of Disabled Workers
Abstract This paper estimates Age–Period–Cohort models on employment rates of Dutch Disability Insurance (DI) applicants. We find that the substantial decrease in employment between 1999 and 2013 is
Sickness and disability systems: comparing outcomes and policies in Norway with those in Sweden, the Netherlands and Switzerland
A broad impression in comparing the reforms is that Norway has conducted fewer measures involving reductions to entitlements and improvements in work incentives compared with the other countries.


The Effect of Disability Insurance Receipt on Labor Supply
This paper exploits the effectively random assignment of judges to Disability Insurance cases to estimate the causal impact of Disability Insurance receipt on labor supply. We find that benefit
Does Disability Insurance Receipt Discourage Work? Using Examiner Assignment to Estimate Causal Effects of SSDI Receipt
We present the first causal estimates of the effect of Social Security Disability Insurance benefit receipt on labor supply using all program applicants. We use new administrative data to match
Screening Disability Insurance Applications
This paper investigates the effects of intensified screening of disability insurance benefit applications. A large-scale experiment was setup where in 2 of the 26 Dutch regions case workers of the
Financial work incentives for disability benefit recipients: lessons from a randomised field experiment
Disability insurance (DI) beneficiaries lose part or all of their benefits if earnings exceed certain thresholds (“cash-cliffs”). This implicit taxation is considered the prime reason for the low
Distinguishing Income from Substitution Effects in Disability Insurance
A set of studies conducted over the last 15 years has produced a near consensus that the Social Security Disability Insurance system (SSDI) has substantial disincentive effects on the labor supply of
The impact of stricter criteria for disability insurance on labor force participation☆
  • S. Staubli
  • Economics
    Journal of public economics
  • 2011
Moral Hazard and Disability Insurance: On the Incidence of Hard-to-Diagnose Medical Conditions in the Canada/Quebec Pension Plan Disability Program
The empirical findings from this paper suggest that the increased generosity of disability benefits has contributed to the increase in the incidence of musculoskeletal conditions on the disability rolls and the increased rigour of the medical screening has induced a reduction in the incidents in recent years.
Disability Insurance Adjudication Criteria and the Incidence of Hard-to-Diagnose Medical Conditions
The estimates suggest that more stringent screening requirements are associated with a statistically significant decline in the reports of hard-to-diagnose conditions, such as low back pain, and that changes in adjudication requirements do not have a statisticallysignificant effect on the report of easier to diagnose conditions.
Earnings Responses to Disability Benefit Cuts
Using Dutch administrative data, we assess the work and earnings capacity of disability insurance (DI) recipients by estimating employment and earnings responses to benefit cuts. Reassessment of DI