Does Separating Intentionality From Mental Representation Imply Radical Enactivism?

@article{Schlicht2018DoesSI,
  title={Does Separating Intentionality From Mental Representation Imply Radical Enactivism?},
  author={T. Schlicht},
  journal={Frontiers in Psychology},
  year={2018},
  volume={9}
}
  • T. Schlicht
  • Published 2018
  • Psychology, Medicine
  • Frontiers in Psychology
Traditionally, intentionality is regarded as that feature of all and only mental states – paradigmatically beliefs and desires – in virtue of which they are directed at or are about something. The problem of intentionality is to explain how it fits into the natural order given the intuition that no physical entity can be intentionally directed in this sense. The basic assumption of this paper, proposed by enactivists, is that failure to naturalize intentionality and mental representation is… Expand
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