Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits

@article{Besley1993DoesEA,
  title={Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits},
  author={Timothy J. Besley and Anne Case},
  journal={Public Choice \& Political Economy eJournal},
  year={1993}
}
  • T. Besley, A. Case
  • Published 1 December 1993
  • Economics
  • Public Choice & Political Economy eJournal
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