• DOI:10.2307/2946699
• Corpus ID: 9309583

Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits

@article{Besley1993DoesEA,
  title={Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits},
  author={Timothy J. Besley and Anne Case},
  journal={Public Choice \& Political Economy eJournal},
  year={1993}
}

• T. Besley, A. Case
• Published 1 December 1993
• Economics
• Public Choice & Political Economy eJournal

This paper analyzes the behavior of U. S. governors from 1950 to 1986 to investigate a reputation-building model of political behavior. We argue that differences in the behavior of governors who face a binding term limit and those who are able to run again provides a source of variation in discount rates that can be used to test a political agency model. We find evidence that taxes, spending, and other policy instruments respond to a binding term limit if a Democrat is in office. The result is a fiscal cycle in term-limit states, which lowers state income when the term limit binds.