Does ‘Ought’ Imply ‘Can’? And Did Kant Think It Does?

@article{Stern2004DoesI,
  title={Does ‘Ought’ Imply ‘Can’? And Did Kant Think It Does?},
  author={R. Stern},
  journal={Utilitas},
  year={2004},
  volume={16},
  pages={42 - 61}
}
  • R. Stern
  • Published 2004
  • Philosophy
  • Utilitas
The aim of this article is twofold. First, it is argued that while the principle of ‘ought implies can’ is certainly plausible in some form, it is tempting to misconstrue it, and that this has happened in the way it has been taken up in some of the current literature. Second, Kant's understanding of the principle is considered. Here it is argued that these problematic conceptions put the principle to work in a way that Kant does not, so that there is an important divergence here which can… Expand
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References

Critique of Practical Reason, trans
  • 1996