Do you know more when it matters less?

@article{Feltz2010DoYK,
  title={Do you know more when it matters less?},
  author={Adam Feltz and Chris Zarpentine},
  journal={Philosophical Psychology},
  year={2010},
  volume={23},
  pages={683 - 706}
}
According to intellectualism, what a person knows is solely a function of the evidential features of the person's situation. Anti-intellectualism is the view that what a person knows is more than simply a function of the evidential features of the person's situation. Jason Stanley (2005) argues that, in addition to “traditional factors,” our ordinary practice of knowledge ascription is sensitive to the practical facts of a subject's situation. In this paper, we investigate this question… 
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