Do the Means Always Justify the Ends, or Do the Ends Sometimes Justify the Means? A Value Protection Model of Justice Reasoning

  title={Do the Means Always Justify the Ends, or Do the Ends Sometimes Justify the Means? A Value Protection Model of Justice Reasoning},
  author={Linda J. Skitka},
  journal={Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin},
  pages={588 - 597}
  • L. Skitka
  • Published 1 May 2002
  • Law
  • Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
This study explored whether personal identity concerns relate in important ways to how people decide whether an event is fair or unfair. Because moral mandates are selective expressions of values that are central to people’s sense of personal identity, people should be highly motivated to protect these positions from possible threat. Consistent with predictions based on a value protection model of justice, whether people had a moral mandate on abortion, civil rights, or immigration was… 

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The role of attitude importance in social evaluation: a study of policy preferences, presidential candidate evaluations, and voting behavior.

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