Do judgments about freedom and responsibility depend on who you are? Personality differences in intuitions about compatibilism and incompatibilism

@article{Feltz2009DoJA,
  title={Do judgments about freedom and responsibility depend on who you are? Personality differences in intuitions about compatibilism and incompatibilism},
  author={A. Feltz and Edward T. Cokely},
  journal={Consciousness and Cognition},
  year={2009},
  volume={18},
  pages={342-350}
}
  • A. Feltz, Edward T. Cokely
  • Published 2009
  • Psychology, Medicine
  • Consciousness and Cognition
  • Recently, there has been an increased interest in folk intuitions about freedom and moral responsibility from both philosophers and psychologists. We aim to extend our understanding of folk intuitions about freedom and moral responsibility using an individual differences approach. Building off previous research suggesting that there are systematic differences in folks' philosophically relevant intuitions, we present new data indicating that the personality trait extraversion predicts, to a… CONTINUE READING
    126 Citations

    Figures, Tables, and Topics from this paper

    Explore Further: Topics Discussed in This Paper

    Persistent bias in expert judgments about free will and moral responsibility: A test of the expertise defense
    • 106
    • PDF
    The Virtues of Ignorance
    • 4
    The Philosophical Personality Argument
    • 36
    An error theory for compatibilist intuitions
    • 17
    Laypersons’ Beliefs and Intuitions About Free Will and Determinism
    • 4
    • PDF
    Forget the Folk: Moral Responsibility Preservation Motives and Other Conditions for Compatibilism
    • 7
    • PDF
    Adaptive variation in judgment and philosophical intuition
    • 36

    References

    SHOWING 1-10 OF 73 REFERENCES
    Folk Intuitions on Free Will
    • 77
    • PDF
    Intuitions and Individual Differences: The Knobe Effect Revisited
    • 157
    • PDF
    The Value of Believing in Free Will
    • 467
    • Highly Influential
    • PDF
    A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded rationality.
    • D. Kahneman
    • Psychology, Medicine
    • The American psychologist
    • 2003
    • 4,063
    • PDF
    Are the folk agent-causationists?
    • 19