Do judgments about freedom and responsibility depend on who you are? Personality differences in intuitions about compatibilism and incompatibilism

  title={Do judgments about freedom and responsibility depend on who you are? Personality differences in intuitions about compatibilism and incompatibilism},
  author={Adam Feltz and Edward T. Cokely},
  journal={Consciousness and Cognition},

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