• DOI:10.1016/S0304-405X(96)00886-0
Corpus ID: 6858750

Do independent directors enhance target shareholder wealth during tender offers

@article{Cotter1997DoID,
  title={Do independent directors enhance target shareholder wealth during tender offers},
  author={J. F. Cotter and A. Shivdasani and Marc Zenner},
  journal={Journal of Financial Economics},
  year={1997},
  volume={43},
  pages={195-218}
}

J. F. Cotter, A. Shivdasani, Marc Zenner

Published 1997

Business

Journal of Financial Economics

Authors' description of their article: Whereas the gains to target shareholders are usually large in tender offers, managers of takeover targets can have incentives to defeat such offers. We examine whether the presence of independent outside directors on boards of tender offer targets help to control such conflicts of interests. Using a sample of 169 tender offer contests that occurred during 1988 to 1992, we document that the gains to target shareholders are significantly greater when the… CONTINUE READING

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