Do independent directors enhance target shareholder wealth during tender offers

@article{Cotter1997DoID,
  title={Do independent directors enhance target shareholder wealth during tender offers},
  author={J. F. Cotter and A. Shivdasani and Marc Zenner},
  journal={Journal of Financial Economics},
  year={1997},
  volume={43},
  pages={195-218}
}
  • J. F. Cotter, A. Shivdasani, Marc Zenner
  • Published 1997
  • Business
  • Journal of Financial Economics
  • Authors' description of their article: Whereas the gains to target shareholders are usually large in tender offers, managers of takeover targets can have incentives to defeat such offers. We examine whether the presence of independent outside directors on boards of tender offer targets help to control such conflicts of interests. Using a sample of 169 tender offer contests that occurred during 1988 to 1992, we document that the gains to target shareholders are significantly greater when the… CONTINUE READING
    812 Citations
    Takeover bids and target directors' incentives: the impact of a bid on directors' wealth and board seats
    • 234
    Governance and Boards of Directors in Closed-end Investment Companies
    • 226
    The Effect of Board Structure on Bidder-Shareholders' Wealth: Further Evidence from the UK Bidding Firms
    • 3
    • Highly Influenced
    • PDF
    Do Bad Boards Allow Bad Acquisitions?

    References

    SHOWING 1-10 OF 37 REFERENCES
    Do outside directors monitor managers
    • 1,446
    Board composition, ownership structure, and hostile takeovers
    • 873