Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the U. S. House

@article{Lee2004DoVA,
  title={Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the U. S. House},
  author={David S. Lee and Enrico Moretti and Matthew J. Butler},
  journal={Quarterly Journal of Economics},
  year={2004},
  volume={119},
  pages={807-859}
}
There are two fundamentally different views of the role of elections in policy formation. In one view, voters can affect candidates' policy choices: competition for votes induces politicians to move toward the center. In this view, elections have the effect of bringing about some degree of policy compromise. In the alternative view, voters merely elect policies: politicians cannot make credible promises to moderate their policies, and elections are merely a means to decide which one of two… 

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