Do States Play Signaling Games

  title={Do States Play Signaling Games},
  author={James Igoe Walsh},
  journal={Cooperation and Conflict},
  • J. I. Walsh
  • Published 1 December 2007
  • Economics
  • Cooperation and Conflict
The study of international conflict and cooperation has long drawn on game theory for insights. Recent developments have made the assumptions of game theory more realistic. Particularly important is the development of signaling games, which analyze situations when decision-makers lack complete information about their environment. Signaling game logic has been applied to many areas of international politics in the past decade, including decisions to go to war, crisis bargaining, international… 

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