Do Nonpartisan Programmatic Policies Have Partisan Electoral Effects? Evidence from Two Large-Scale Experiments

@article{Imai2020DoNP,
  title={Do Nonpartisan Programmatic Policies Have Partisan Electoral Effects? Evidence from Two Large-Scale Experiments},
  author={Kosuke Imai and Gary King and Carlos Velasco Rivera},
  journal={The Journal of Politics},
  year={2020},
  volume={82},
  pages={714 - 730}
}
A vast literature demonstrates that voters around the world who benefit from government discretionary spending increase their electoral support for the incumbent party. But, contrary to theories of political accountability, some suggest that voters also reward incumbent parties for “programmatic” spending, over which incumbents have no discretion, even when passed with support from all major parties. Why voters would attribute responsibility when none exists is unclear, as is why minority… 
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