• Corpus ID: 14258964

Do Informed Voters Make Better Choices? Experimental Evidence from Urban India

  title={Do Informed Voters Make Better Choices? Experimental Evidence from Urban India},
  author={Abhijit Banerjee and Selvan Ramesh Kumar and Rohini Prabha Pande and Felix Su},
Disclosure laws for politicians exist in over a hundred countries. But can public disclosures about politician performance and qualications inuence electoral accountability in settings characterized by weak institutions and less educated populations? In the run-up to the 2008 elections in Delhi we implemented a eld experiment where we provided slum 

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