Do-Gooder Derogation

  title={Do-Gooder Derogation},
  author={Julia A. Minson and Benoit Monin},
  journal={Social Psychological and Personality Science},
  pages={200 - 207}
  • J. MinsonB. Monin
  • Published 1 March 2012
  • Psychology
  • Social Psychological and Personality Science
Two studies document do-gooder derogation (the putting down of morally motivated others), by studying the reactions of meat eaters to vegetarians. In Study 1, 47% of participants freely associated negative terms with vegetarians and the valence of the words was negatively related to how much participants expected vegetarians to see themselves as morally superior to nonvegetarians. In Study 2, we manipulated the salience of anticipated moral reproach by varying whether participants reported… 

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