Do Democracies Engage Less in Coup-Proofing? On the Relationship between Regime Type and Civil—Military Relations

@article{Pilster2012DoDE,
  title={Do Democracies Engage Less in Coup-Proofing? On the Relationship between Regime Type and Civil—Military Relations},
  author={Ulrich Pilster and Tobias B{\"o}hmelt},
  journal={Foreign Policy Analysis},
  year={2012},
  volume={8},
  pages={355-371}
}
The existing literature on military effectiveness established the robust claim that democracies are more successful and effective in winning interstate wars. One mechanism that explains this relationship heavily draws upon the underlying effect of regime type on civil—military relations. Still, this relationship has not yet been explored systematically, and rigorous empirical research on this issue remains surprisingly scarce. In order to address this shortcoming, this study investigates the… 

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