Do Boards Pay Attention When Institutional Investor Activists 'Just Vote No'?
@article{Guercio2008DoBP, title={Do Boards Pay Attention When Institutional Investor Activists 'Just Vote No'?}, author={Diane Del Guercio and L. Seery and Tracie Woidtke}, journal={Journal of Financial Economics}, year={2008}, volume={90}, pages={84-103} }
We examine "just vote no" campaigns, a recent innovation in low-cost shareholder activist tools whereby activists encourage their fellow shareholders to withhold votes toward a director's election to express dissatisfaction with management performance or the firm's corporate governance structure. Grundfest [1993. Just vote no: a minimalist strategy for dealing with barbarians inside the gates. Stanford Law Review 45, 857-937] argues that a substantial withheld vote motivates directors to take… CONTINUE READING
282 Citations
Boards’ Response to Shareholders’ Dissatisfaction: The Case of Shareholders’ Say on Pay in the UK
- 2015
Boards' Response to Shareholders' Dissatisfaction: The Case of Shareholders' Say on Pay in the UK
- Business
- 2015
- 58
Corporate Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders: Evidence from Proxy Voting
- Economics
- 2012
- 141
- PDF
References
SHOWING 1-10 OF 56 REFERENCES