Do Alliances Really Deter?

  title={Do Alliances Really Deter?},
  author={Michael R. Kenwick and John A. Vasquez and Matthew Powers},
  journal={The Journal of Politics},
  pages={943 - 954}
The scholarly literature is still divided on the relationship between defensive alliances and interstate conflict. While some scholars argue that defensive alliances can deter conflict, others posit that alliances accelerate its approach. This article seeks to make headway in the debate by using a research design that examines whether the recent formation of defensive alliances leads to increases or reductions in militarized disputes and war. We find that this relationship differs in the pre… Expand
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