Divorce Laws and Assortative Mating in the Marriage Market

@inproceedings{Liu2018DivorceLA,
  title={Divorce Laws and Assortative Mating in the Marriage Market},
  author={Sitian Liu},
  year={2018}
}
In the 1970s, many states introduced unilateral divorce laws, which allow one spouse to terminate the marriage without the consent of the other spouse. This paper investigates how the introduction of unilateral divorce laws affects assortative mating in the marriage market and the heterogeneous effects across states with different marital property division systems. I use the difference-in-differences strategy to compare the correlation of spouses’ premarital income between newlyweds in states… CONTINUE READING

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