Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 Equilibrium Equivalence with J Candidates and N Voters

@inproceedings{Patty1999DivisionOT,
  title={Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 Equilibrium Equivalence with J Candidates and N Voters},
  author={John W. Patty},
  year={1999}
}
In this paper, we examine the incentives facing candidates in the spatial voting model. We assume that voters' types are independent, but allow for nonidentical distributions across voters. Examining candidate positional equilibria as a function of voter behavior, we nd that what we term p-symmetric strict p-local equilibria when candidates maximize expected plurality are also strict p-local equilibris when candidates maximize probability of victory. This result holds for arbitrary numbers of… CONTINUE READING

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