Divine foreknowledge and Newcomb's paradox

@article{Craig1987DivineFA,
  title={Divine foreknowledge and Newcomb's paradox},
  author={William Lane Craig},
  journal={Philosophia},
  year={1987},
  volume={17},
  pages={331-350}
}
  • W. Craig
  • Published 1 October 1987
  • Philosophy
  • Philosophia
ConclusionNewcomb's Paradox thus serves as an illustrative vindication of the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom. A proper understanding of the counterfactual conditionals involved enables us to see that the pastness of God's knowledge serves neither to make God's beliefs counterfactually closed nor to rob us of genuine freedom. It is evident that our decisions determine God's past beliefs about those decisions and do so without invoking an objectionable backward causation… 

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