Dividing and Discarding: A Procedure for Taking Decisions with Non-transferable Utility

Abstract

We consider a setting in which two players must take a single action. The analysis is done within a private values model in which (i) the players’ preferences over actions are private information, (ii) utility is non-transferable, (iii) implementation is Bayesian and (iv) the welfare criterion is utilitarian. We characterize an optimal monotonic allocation… (More)

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Cite this paper

@inproceedings{Carrasco2008DividingAD, title={Dividing and Discarding: A Procedure for Taking Decisions with Non-transferable Utility}, author={Vinicius Carrasco and William Fuchs and Wouter Dessein and Sergio Firpo and Niko Matouschek and Juan Torres Martinez and Humberto Moreira}, year={2008} }