Dividends and Expropriation

@article{Faccio2000DividendsAE,
  title={Dividends and Expropriation},
  author={Mara Faccio and Larry H. P. Lang and Leslie Young},
  journal={Corporate Finance: Capital Structure \& Payout Policies},
  year={2000}
}
Whereas most U.S. corporations are widely held, the predominant form of ownership in East Asia is control by a family, which often supplies a top manager. These features of "crony capitalism" are actually more pronounced in Western Europe. In both regions, the salient agency problem is expropriation of outside shareholders by controlling shareholders. Dividends provide evidence on this. Group-affiliated corporations in Europe pay higher dividends than in Asia, dampening insider expropriation… 

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