Diversity of reproduction time scale promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games.

  title={Diversity of reproduction time scale promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner's dilemma games.},
  author={Zhi-Xi Wu and Zhihai Rong and Petter Holme},
  journal={Physical review. E, Statistical, nonlinear, and soft matter physics},
  volume={80 3 Pt 2},
We study an evolutionary spatial prisoner's dilemma game where the fitness of the players is determined by both the payoffs from the current interaction and their history. We consider the situation where the selection time scale is slower than the interaction time scale. This is done by implementing probabilistic reproduction on an individual level. We observe that both too fast and too slow reproduction rates hamper the emergence of cooperation. In other words, there exists an intermediate… 

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