Distributive Politics with Primaries

@article{Hirano2009DistributivePW,
  title={Distributive Politics with Primaries},
  author={S. Hirano and J. Snyder and Michael M. Ting},
  journal={The Journal of Politics},
  year={2009},
  volume={71},
  pages={1467 - 1480}
}
We develop a model of electoral competition in which two parties compete for votes amongst three groups of voters. Each party first internally selects one of two candidates to run in a general election. Candidates within a party share a fixed ideological platform and can promise a distribution of a unit of public spending across groups. Without primary elections, the selection process is random. With primary elections, an ideologically friendly subset of the voters strategically chooses the… Expand
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