Distributive Politics and the Persistence of Amtrak

  title={Distributive Politics and the Persistence of Amtrak},
  author={David P. Baron},
  journal={The Journal of Politics},
  pages={883 - 913}
  • D. P. Baron
  • Published 1 August 1990
  • Economics
  • The Journal of Politics
Since its inception, Amtrak has required large federal operating and capital subsidies yet has maintained strong congressional support even in periods of record federal deficits. The benefits of Amtrak services accrue primarily to passengers and labor along its routes, and hence, like a pork-barrel program, Amtrak provides particularistic benefits at the expense of taxpayers. Based on the hypothesis that the politics of Amtrak are largely distributive, this paper investigates congressional… 
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