• DOI:10.2307/2131831
• Corpus ID: 153981819

Distributive Politics and the Persistence of Amtrak

@article{Baron1990DistributivePA,
  title={Distributive Politics and the Persistence of Amtrak},
  author={David P. Baron},
  journal={The Journal of Politics},
  year={1990},
  volume={52},
  pages={883 - 913}
}

• D. P. Baron
• Published 1 August 1990
• Economics
• The Journal of Politics

Since its inception, Amtrak has required large federal operating and capital subsidies yet has maintained strong congressional support even in periods of record federal deficits. The benefits of Amtrak services accrue primarily to passengers and labor along its routes, and hence, like a pork-barrel program, Amtrak provides particularistic benefits at the expense of taxpayers. Based on the hypothesis that the politics of Amtrak are largely distributive, this paper investigates congressional action in 1979 that would eliminate or preserve Amtrak routes and hence the distribution of benefits and the corresponding subsidy. The theory is tested using six roll-call votes some of which pertained to specific routes and others of which pertained to Amtrak as a whole. The estimates for those votes that pertain to specific routes indicate that members of Congress from those districts affected voted in favor of preserving train service. For those votes that pertain to Amtrak as a whole, the data on the distributive consequences are less accurate, and the customary measure of ideology appears to reflect unmeasured distributive consequences. The continued existence of a nationwide, intercity passenger rail network thus rests on the political support derived from the distributive consequences it generates.