Distributional Conflict between Powerful States and International Treaty Ratification

@article{Schneider2011DistributionalCB,
  title={Distributional Conflict between Powerful States and International Treaty Ratification},
  author={Christina J. Schneider and Johannes Urpelainen},
  journal={PSN: International Cooperation (Topic)},
  year={2011}
}
Why do states ratify international treaties? While previous research has emphasized domestic political factors, we focus on power politics in situations in which powerful states disagree on the merits of a treaty. We argue that states supporting the status quo should discourage third parties from ratifying the treaty, whereas challenger states should entice them to do so. Based on this theory, we expect third parties’ ratification decisions to be influenced by their dependence on the… 
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