Distributed Games

  title={Distributed Games},
  author={Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz},
The Internet exhibits forms of interactions which are not captured by existing models in economics and artificial intelligence. New models are needed to deal with these interactions. In this paper we present a new model—distributed games. In such a model each player controls a number of agents which participate in asynchronous parallel multiagent interactions (games). The agents jointly and strategically (partially) control the level of information monitoring and the level of recall by… CONTINUE READING
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