Dissociating Empathy From Perspective-Taking: Evidence From Intra- and Inter-Individual Differences Research

  title={Dissociating Empathy From Perspective-Taking: Evidence From Intra- and Inter-Individual Differences Research},
  author={Julia Stietz and Emanuel Jauk and S{\"o}ren Krach and Philipp Kanske},
  journal={Frontiers in Psychiatry},
Humans have the capacity to share others' emotions, be they positive or negative. Elicited by the observed or imagined emotion of another person, an observer develops a similar emotional state herself. This capacity, empathy, is one of the pillars of social understanding and interaction as it creates a representation of another's inner, mental state. Empathy needs to be dissociated from other social emotions and, crucially, also from cognitive mechanisms of understanding others, the ability to… 

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