Dispute Resolution Institutions and Strategic Militarization

  title={Dispute Resolution Institutions and Strategic Militarization},
  author={Adam Meirowitz and M. Morelli and Kristopher W. Ramsay and Francesco Squintani},
  journal={Journal of Political Economy},
  pages={378 - 418}
  • Adam Meirowitz, M. Morelli, +1 author Francesco Squintani
  • Published 2019
  • Political Science
  • Journal of Political Economy
  • Engagement in a destructive war can be understood as the “punishment” for entering into a dispute. Institutions that reduce the chance that disputes lead to war make this punishment less severe. This may incentivize hawkish policies like militarization and potentially offset the benefits of peace brokering. We study a model in which unmediated peace talks are effective at improving the peace chance for given militarization but lead to more militarization and ultimately to a higher incidence of… CONTINUE READING
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