Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge

@article{Goldman1976DiscriminationAP,
  title={Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge},
  author={Alvin I. Goldman},
  journal={The Journal of Philosophy},
  year={1976},
  volume={73},
  pages={771-791}
}
  • A. Goldman
  • Published 18 November 1976
  • Philosophy
  • The Journal of Philosophy
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