Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment

  title={Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment},
  author={Thomas Kelly},
  • T. Kelly
  • Published 25 April 2013
  • Psychology

Disagreement, peerhood, and three paradoxes of Conciliationism

Conciliatory theories of disagreement require that one lower one’s confidence in a belief in the face of disagreement from an epistemic peer, but when putative epistemic peers disagree about epistemicpeerhood, then Conciliationism makes contradictory demands and paradoxes arise.

From Independence to Conciliationism: An Obituary

Conciliationists about peer disagreement hold that when one disagrees with an epistemic peer about some proposition p, one should significantly change one's view about p. Many arguments for

A Faithful Response to Disagreement

In the peer disagreement debate, three intuitively attractive claims seem to conflict: there is disagreement among peers on many important matters; peer disagreement is a serious challenge to one's

XI—Literature and Disagreement

To understand rational response to ethical disagreement, we need to consider how epistemic and ethical factors interact. The notion of an ethical peer is developed, and the roles that epistemic and

Disagreement and the division of epistemic labor

It is argued that the epistemic benefits that result from the deliberative division of epistemic labor can provide epistemic reason to maintain confidence in cases of disagreement and constitutes a distinct kind of epistem dependence.

Disagreement and Intellectual Scepticism

Several philosophers have recently argued that disagreement with others undermines or precludes epistemic justification for our opinions about controversial issues (e.g. political, religious, and

Resolving Peer Disagreements Through Imprecise Probabilities

The notion of a set-based credal judgment to frame and address a range of subtle issues that arise in peer disagreements is introduced, and the theory of imprecise probability allows one to satisfy both principles.

Steadfast Views of Disagreement are Incoherent

Abstract In this paper, I argue that Steadfast Views of peer disagreement - a family of views according to which standing firm in the face of peer disagreement can be rationally permissible are

Making sense of non-factual disagreement in science.

13 Dilemmas, Disagreement, and Dualism

What should we do when someone who is smart and well-informed disagrees with us? Should we change our opinion, or hold fast to our previous viewpoint? This question has divided epistemologists, and



Peer disagreement and higher order evidence

My aim in this article is to develop and defend a novel answer to a question that has recently generated a considerable amount of controversy. The question concerns the normative significance of peer

The Skeptic and the Dogmatist

Dans la cadre du debat sur la perception du monde exterieur qui oppose le scepticisme et le faillibilisme, l'A. defend une position dogmatique inspiree de l'epistemologie antisceptique de G. E.

The Epistemology of Disagreement

How should we respond to disagreement with people we regard as our peers?1 It is an important feature of our intellectual lives that we take such disagreements seriously, that we seek out alternate

Conciliatory Views of Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence

ABSTRACT Conciliatory views of disagreement maintain that discovering a particular type of disagreement requires that one make doxastic conciliation. In this paper I give a more formal

Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy

How much should your confidence in your beliefs be shaken when you learn that others – perhaps ‘epistemic peers’ who seem as well-qualified as you are – hold beliefs contrary to yours? This article

How to disagree about how to disagree

When one encounters disagreement about the truth of a factual claim from a trusted advisor who has access to all of one's evidence, should that move one in the direction of the advisor's view?

Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News

We all live out our lives in states of epistemic imperfection. Most obviously, this is true because the evidence on which we base our beliefs is limited. Only a little less obviously, we live in

Reflection and Disagreement

How should you take into account the opinions of an advisor? When you completely defer to the advisor's judgment (the manner in which she responds to her evidence), then you should treat the advisor

Common Sense as Evidence: Against Revisionary Ontology and Skepticism

In this age of post-Moorean modesty, many of us are inclined to doubt that philosophy is in possession of arguments that might genuinely serve to undermine what we ordinarily believe. It may perhaps

Following the argument where it leads

Throughout the history of western philosophy, the Socratic injunction to ‘follow the argument where it leads’ has exerted a powerful attraction. But what is it, exactly, to follow the argument where