Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment

  title={Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment},
  author={Thomas Kelly},
  • T. Kelly
  • Published 25 April 2013
  • Psychology
Disagreement, peerhood, and three paradoxes of Conciliationism
Conciliatory theories of disagreement require that one lower one’s confidence in a belief in the face of disagreement from an epistemic peer, but when putative epistemic peers disagree about epistemicpeerhood, then Conciliationism makes contradictory demands and paradoxes arise.
From Independence to Conciliationism: An Obituary
Conciliationists about peer disagreement hold that when one disagrees with an epistemic peer about some proposition p, one should significantly change one's view about p. Many arguments for
XI—Literature and Disagreement
To understand rational response to ethical disagreement, we need to consider how epistemic and ethical factors interact. The notion of an ethical peer is developed, and the roles that epistemic and
Disagreement and the division of epistemic labor
It is argued that the epistemic benefits that result from the deliberative division of epistemic labor can provide epistemic reason to maintain confidence in cases of disagreement and constitutes a distinct kind of epistem dependence.
Disagreement and Intellectual Scepticism
Several philosophers have recently argued that disagreement with others undermines or precludes epistemic justification for our opinions about controversial issues (e.g. political, religious, and
Steadfast Views of Disagreement are Incoherent
In this paper, I argue that Steadfast Views of peer disagreement – a family of views according to which standing firm in the face of peer disagreement can be rationally permissible – are incoherent.
13 Dilemmas, Disagreement, and Dualism
What should we do when someone who is smart and well-informed disagrees with us? Should we change our opinion, or hold fast to our previous viewpoint? This question has divided epistemologists, and
Peerhood in deep religious disagreements
Abstract My aim in this article is to widen the scope of the current debate on peer disagreement by applying it to a kind of case it has hitherto remained silent about – namely, to cases of
Consensus Gentium: Reflections on the ‘Common Consent’ Argument for the Existence of God
As the human intellect, though weak, is not essentially perverted, there is a certain presumption of the truth of any opinion held by many human minds, requiring to be rebutted by assigning some
The epistemic significance of political disagreement
The degree of doxastic revision required in response to evidence of disagreement is typically thought to be a function of our beliefs about (1) our interlocutor’s familiarity with the relevant


Peer disagreement and higher order evidence
My aim in this article is to develop and defend a novel answer to a question that has recently generated a considerable amount of controversy. The question concerns the normative significance of peer
The Skeptic and the Dogmatist
Dans la cadre du debat sur la perception du monde exterieur qui oppose le scepticisme et le faillibilisme, l'A. defend une position dogmatique inspiree de l'epistemologie antisceptique de G. E.
The Epistemology of Disagreement
How should we respond to disagreement with people we regard as our peers?1 It is an important feature of our intellectual lives that we take such disagreements seriously, that we seek out alternate
Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy
How much should your confidence in your beliefs be shaken when you learn that others – perhaps ‘epistemic peers’ who seem as well-qualified as you are – hold beliefs contrary to yours? This article
How to disagree about how to disagree
When one encounters disagreement about the truth of a factual claim from a trusted advisor who has access to all of one's evidence, should that move one in the direction of the advisor's view?
Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News
We all live out our lives in states of epistemic imperfection. Most obviously, this is true because the evidence on which we base our beliefs is limited. Only a little less obviously, we live in
Reflection and Disagreement
How should you take into account the opinions of an advisor? When you completely defer to the advisor's judgment (the manner in which she responds to her evidence), then you should treat the advisor
Common Sense as Evidence: Against Revisionary Ontology and Skepticism
In this age of post-Moorean modesty, many of us are inclined to doubt that philosophy is in possession of arguments that might genuinely serve to undermine what we ordinarily believe. It may perhaps
Following the argument where it leads
Throughout the history of western philosophy, the Socratic injunction to ‘follow the argument where it leads’ has exerted a powerful attraction. But what is it, exactly, to follow the argument where
What is the “Equal Weight View”?
ABSTRACT In this paper, we investigate various possible (Bayesian) precisifications of the (somewhat vague) statements of “the equal weight view” (EWV) that have appeared in the recent literature on