Direct voting and proxy voting

@article{GreenArmytage2015DirectVA,
  title={Direct voting and proxy voting},
  author={James Green-Armytage},
  journal={Constitutional Political Economy},
  year={2015},
  volume={26},
  pages={190-220}
}
I develop a hybrid of direct democracy and representative democracy in which each citizen may vote directly on each issue, or delegate his vote on any issue to a representative (that is, a proxy) of his own choosing. I construct both an axiomatic argument for such a system and an argument based on its ability to ameliorate the information problems inherent in both direct and representative democracy. I also propose practical measures for implementation, including new variations on existing… 
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