Direct Reference, Psychological Explanation, and Frege Cases

@article{Schneider2005DirectRP,
  title={Direct Reference, Psychological Explanation, and Frege Cases},
  author={S. Schneider},
  journal={Mind & Language},
  year={2005},
  volume={20},
  pages={423-447}
}
:  In this essay I defend a theory of psychological explanation that is based on the joint commitment to direct reference and computationalism. I offer a new solution to the problem of Frege Cases. Frege Cases involve agents who are unaware that certain expressions co-refer (e.g. that ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ co-refer), where such knowledge is relevant to the success of their behavior, leading to cases in which the agents fail to behave as the intentional laws predict. It is generally agreed that… Expand
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