Corpus ID: 237497403

Direct Implementation with Evidence

  title={Direct Implementation with Evidence},
  author={Soumen Banerjee and Yi-Chun Chen and Yifei Sun},
We study full implementation with evidence in an environment with bounded utilities. We show that a social choice function is Nash implementable in a direct revelation mechanism if and only if it satisfies the measurability condition proposed by Ben-Porath and Lipman (2012). Building on a novel classification of lies according to their refutability with evidence, the mechanism requires only two agents, accounts for mixed-strategy equilibria and accommodates evidentiary costs. While monetary… Expand


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