Diffusion in Social Networks with Competing Products

@article{Apt2011DiffusionIS,
  title={Diffusion in Social Networks with Competing Products},
  author={Krzysztof R. Apt and Evangelos K. Markakis},
  journal={ArXiv},
  year={2011},
  volume={abs/1105.2434}
}
We introduce a new threshold model of social networks, in which the nodes influenced by their neighbours can adopt one out of several alternatives. We characterize the graphs for which adoption of a product by the whole network is possible (respectively necessary) and the ones for which a unique outcome is guaranteed. These characterizations directly yield polynomial time algorithms that allow us to determine whether a given social network satisfies one of the above properties. We also study… 
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