Differential fault analysis on the ARIA algorithm

  title={Differential fault analysis on the ARIA algorithm},
  author={W. Li and D. Gu and Juanru Li},
  journal={Inf. Sci.},
  • W. Li, D. Gu, Juanru Li
  • Published 2008
  • Computer Science
  • Inf. Sci.
  • The ARIA algorithm is a Korean Standard block cipher, which is optimized for lightweight environments. On the basis of the byte-oriented model and the differential analysis principle, we propose a differential fault attack on the ARIA algorithm. Mathematical analysis and simulating experiment show that our attack can recover its 128-bit secret key by introducing 45 faulty ciphertexts. Simultaneously, we also present a fault detection technique for protecting ARIA against this proposed analysis… CONTINUE READING
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