Corpus ID: 170962489

Die konzeptionellen Grundlagen der Spieltheorie einst und jetzt

@inproceedings{Selten2001DieKG,
  title={Die konzeptionellen Grundlagen der Spieltheorie einst und jetzt},
  author={Reinhard Selten},
  year={2001}
}
Das fundamentale Werk von John von Neumann und Oskar Morgenstern (1944) hat die Spieltheorie als Gebiet begrundet. Es gab zwar vorher schon den in deutscher Sprache veroffentlichen Beitrag von John Neumann (1928) " Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele", aber erst mit dem Buch aus dem Jahre 1944 wurde in der wissen-schaftlichen Welt genugend Aufmerksamkeit erregt, um einen breiteren Strom von Forschung in Gang zu setzen. Die offenen Fragen, vor allem im Bereich der kooperativen von Neumann… Expand
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