Die Widerspruchsfreiheit der Stufenlogik

  title={Die Widerspruchsfreiheit der Stufenlogik},
  author={G. Gentzen},
  journal={Mathematische Zeitschrift},
  • G. Gentzen
  • Published 1 December 1936
  • Mathematics
  • Mathematische Zeitschrift
Part I: A sketch of Gentzen’s life and work
Gerhard Gentzen died on August 4, 1945, in a prison in Prague. His fellow prisoners were professors of the local German university, and there are accounts of his last days and how he was, rendered
Logic Reduced To Bare (Proof-Theoretical) Bones
  • J. Peregrin
  • Mathematics, Computer Science
    J. Log. Lang. Inf.
  • 2015
The aim of this paper is to investigate the relationship of the two approaches within a very general framework, to discuss the viability of erecting logic on such austere foundations, and to find out whether choosing one of the ways the authors are inevitably led to a specific logical system is chosen.
Gentzen's Logic
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  • Computer Science, Mathematics
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  • 2009
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In this thesis I provide a survey over different approaches to second-order logic and its interpretation, and introduce a novel approach. Of special interest are the questions whether (a particular
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« Oui c’est imbecile ce que je dis ! Seulement je ne sais pas comment concilier tout ca. Il est sur que je ne me sens libre que parce que j’ai fait mes classes et que je ne sors de la fugue que parce