Dictator game giving: Rules of fairness versus acts of kindness

  title={Dictator game giving: Rules of fairness versus acts of kindness},
  author={Gary E. Bolton and Elena Katok and Rami Zwick},
  journal={International Journal of Game Theory},
Abstract. In both dictator and impunity games, one player, the dictator, divides a fixed amount of money between himself and one other, the recipient. Recent lab studies of these games have produced seemingly inconsistent results, reporting substantially divergent amounts of dictator giving. Also, one prominent explanation for some of these differences, the impact of experimenter observation, displayed weak explanatory power in a different but related lab game. Data from the new experiment… 
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