Device calibration impacts security of quantum key distribution.

@article{Jain2011DeviceCI,
  title={Device calibration impacts security of quantum key distribution.},
  author={Nitin Jain and Christoffer Wittmann and Lars Lydersen and Carlos Wiechers and Dominique Elser and Christoph Marquardt and Vadim Makarov and Gerd Leuchs},
  journal={Physical review letters},
  year={2011},
  volume={107 11},
  pages={
          110501
        }
}
Characterizing the physical channel and calibrating the cryptosystem hardware are prerequisites for establishing a quantum channel for quantum key distribution (QKD). Moreover, an inappropriately implemented calibration routine can open a fatal security loophole. We propose and experimentally demonstrate a method to induce a large temporal detector efficiency mismatch in a commercial QKD system by deceiving a channel length calibration routine. We then devise an optimal and realistic strategy… 

Figures and Tables from this paper

Preventing Calibration Attacks on the Local Oscillator in Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution

This work proposes and provides experimental evidence of an attack targeting the local oscillator calibration routine of a continuous-variable QKD system and describes the loophole, which can be used to perform successfully an intercept-resend attack.

Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Cryptography

A novel approach to quantum key distribution, called measurement-device-independent QKD (mdiQKD), has been proposed, which can remove all side-channels from the measurement unit, arguably the most vulnerable part in QKKD systems, thus offering a clear avenue toward secure QkD realisations.

Secure quantum key distribution with realistic devices

This review gives both sides of the story, with the current best theory of quantum security, and an extensive survey of what makes quantum cryptosystem safe in practice.

Quantum man-in-the-middle attack on the calibration process of quantum key distribution

This paper reveals the security risk of the calibration process of a passive-basis-choice BB84 QKD system by launching a quantum man-in-the-middle attack which intercepts all calibration signals and resends faked ones, and proposes a basis-dependent detector efficiency mismatch (BEM) based faked states attack on a single photon BB84QKD to stress the threat of BEM.

Preventing Quantum Hacking in Continuous Variable Quantum Key Distribution

Security loopholes have been shown for discrete-variable Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). Here, we propose and provide experimental evidence of an attack targeting a continuous-variable QKD system. We

Optimization of Quantum Key Distribution Protocols

This work describes BBM92, DPSK, SARG04 and finally MDI from the largest possible communication distance and highest secret key bitrate to discuss how any protocol can be optimized.

Hacking on decoy-state quantum key distribution system with partial phase randomization

It is shown that partial phase randomization is not sufficient to guarantee the security of phase-encoding QKD systems with weak coherent states, and the eavesdropper is able to steal all the key information without discovered by the users.

Experimental demonstration of polarization encoding measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution.

This work paves the way for the realization of a MDI-QKD network, in which the users only need compact and low-cost state-preparation devices and can share complicated and expensive detectors provided by an untrusted network server.

Characterisation of state preparation uncertainty in quantum key distribution

To achieve secure quantum key distribution, all imperfections in the source unit must be incorpo-rated in a security proof and measured in the lab. Here we perform a proof-of-principle demonstra-tion

Timing attacks on practical quantum cryptographic systems

  • N. Jain
  • Computer Science, Physics
  • 2012
Synchronization of electronic & optoelectronic components involved in such tasks thus becomes a necessary and important step, however, it also opens up the possibility of timing-based loopholes and attacks.
...