Development and the Liberal Peace: What Does it Take to be a Trading State?

  title={Development and the Liberal Peace: What Does it Take to be a Trading State?},
  author={H{\aa}vard Hegre},
  journal={Journal of Peace Research},
  pages={30 - 5}
  • H. Hegre
  • Published 1 January 2000
  • Economics, Political Science
  • Journal of Peace Research
This article investigates the liberal idea that trade between two states reduces the likelihood of militarized conflict between them. Richard Rosecrance's argument that industrial-technological developments have made peaceful trading strategies more efficient today is examined in connection with the empirical literature on trade and conflict. Development affects the utility calculations of states: since the costs of seizing and holding a territory increase with increased development, and the… 

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