Development and neurophysiology of mentalizing.

  title={Development and neurophysiology of mentalizing.},
  author={Uta Frith and Chris D. Frith},
  journal={Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences},
  volume={358 1431},
  • U. Frith, C. Frith
  • Published 29 March 2003
  • Psychology, Biology
  • Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences
The mentalizing (theory of mind) system of the brain is probably in operation from ca. 18 months of age, allowing implicit attribution of intentions and other mental states. Between the ages of 4 and 6 years explicit mentalizing becomes possible, and from this age children are able to explain the misleading reasons that have given rise to a false belief. Neuroimaging studies of mentalizing have so far only been carried out in adults. They reveal a system with three components consistently… 

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