Deterring threats and settling scores: How coups influence respect for physical integrity rights

@article{Curtice2019DeterringTA,
  title={Deterring threats and settling scores: How coups influence respect for physical integrity rights},
  author={Travis B. Curtice and Daniel Arnon},
  journal={Conflict Management and Peace Science},
  year={2019},
  volume={37},
  pages={655 - 673}
}
Do coups affect patterns of political violence like violations of physical integrity rights? Do these patterns vary depending on whether coups succeed or fail? We argue that political uncertainty from coups decreases respect for physical integrity rights. Post-coup regimes preemptively repress as a show of strength to deter threats from those excluded from power and settle scores through cycles of retaliation. Additionally, we argue that the retaliation cycle of score settling will last longer… 

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