Deterrence or Escalation?

  title={Deterrence or Escalation?},
  author={M. Lichbach},
  journal={Journal of Conflict Resolution},
  pages={266 - 297}
  • M. Lichbach
  • Published 1987
  • Economics
  • Journal of Conflict Resolution
Aggregate data studies of domestic political conflict have used an Action-Reaction (AR) model that has produced contradictory findings about the repression/dissent nexus: Repression by regimes may either increase or decrease dissent by opposition groups. To clarify these findings I propose an alternative Rational Actor (RA) model from which are derived three propositions. (1) An increase in a government's repression of nonviolence will reduce the nonviolent activities of an opposition group but… Expand
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