Deterrence by denial in cyberspace

@article{Borghard2021DeterrenceBD,
  title={Deterrence by denial in cyberspace},
  author={Erica D. Borghard and Shawn W. Lonergan},
  journal={Journal of Strategic Studies},
  year={2021}
}
Many scholars and practitioners are unconvinced that cyber deterrence is possible. This article aims to demonstrate why some of this skepticism is misplaced, as well as provide greater clarity and ... 

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